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In this study, we investigate the accruals patterns of Chinese listed ﬁrms that cross-list
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) to shed light on the role of auditor choice in
improving cross-listed ﬁrms’ accounting quality. The extant literature shows that ﬁrms
that cross-list on US exchanges have higher earnings quality. For instance, they have less
aggressive earnings management, more conservative earnings, more timely loss recogni-
tion and a stronger association between accounting data and share prices, compared with
non-cross-listed ﬁrms in their home markets (Lang et al., 2003; Huikgen and Lubberink,
2005). However, as Leuz (2006, p. 298) notes, ‘‘the mechanism by which cross listings im-
prove corporate behavior is not well understood.’’
In this spirit, this study focuses on the effects of auditor choice on the characteristics of
earnings for cross-listed ﬁrms in China. Previous research demonstrates the role of audi-
tors in constraining ﬁrms’ ability to manipulate earnings (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis
et al., 1999). Thus, the characteristics of reported accounting data should be jointly shaped
by managers and auditors. By examining the effect of auditor choice, we can identify a spe-
ciﬁc channel that helps to explain why cross-listed ﬁrms have better accounting quality
than non-cross-listed ﬁrms.
In particular, we are interested in investigating whether there are systematic differences
in the accruals-based earnings of clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.1 Francis et al.
(2009, p. 53) demonstrate that accruals can map onto earnings quality because accruals
are the product of estimations and judgments by managers about future events and manag-
ers have discretion to distort accruals opportunistically to meet earnings targets. Further-
more, a number of studies have sought to link auditor size to accruals patterns and found
that Big 4 clients have lower abnormal accruals than non-Big 4 clients, consistent with the
theory that larger auditors are more effective at constraining opportunistic reporting by
managers (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993).
Nevertheless, exactly what drives the difference in audit quality between big and small
auditors remains debatable in the extant literature. One explanation is based on reputa-
tion. DeAngelo (1981) argues that a large auditor has a greater reputation to lose (greater
aggregate reduction in quasi rent) if it provides low-quality audits. An alternative hypoth-
esis is that wealthier auditors are more at risk from litigation and therefore have a greater
incentive to issue accurate reports (Dye, 1993). Although several papers conclude that the
insurance rationale for audit quality appears to dominate the reputation rationale (Lennox,
1999; Willenborg, 1999; Khurana and Raman, 2004), some studies also show that reputa-
tion does matter for audit quality (e.g., Weber et al., 2008).
China’s A-share ﬁrms cross-listed on HKEx provide a clean setting for us to investigate
the reputation rationale of Big 4 audits in an emerging market. The regulations require A-
share ﬁrms cross-listed on HKEx (referred to as CL ﬁrms) to perform dual–audit and dual-
reporting, based on Chinese GAAP and IFRS, respectively. Typically, a Hong Kong audit ﬁrm
provides audit services for a CL ﬁrm based on IFRS. At the same time, another domestic
audit ﬁrm provides audit services for the same ﬁrm based on Chinese GAAP. Generally,
when a CL ﬁrm hires a mainland-based Big 4 ﬁrm for ﬁnancial statement audits based1 The term ‘‘Big 4’’ is used because of the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002. However, Arthur Andersen was viewed as one of
the ‘‘Big 5’’ during our sample period of 1998–2001. The ‘‘Big 5’’ auditors were Deloitte Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Arthur Andersen.
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hire the same Big 4 ﬁrm in Hong Kong (e.g., KPMG Huazheng versus KPMG Hong Kong) for
ﬁnancial statement audits based on IFRS (referred to as an overseas auditor). Because
domestic auditors who provide audit services for CL ﬁrms are not exposed to jurisdiction
and liability under the stock regulations or laws of Hong Kong, there is no substantial
change in their litigation risk. However, given that reputation plays an important role in
the Hong Kong audit market, domestic Big 4 member ﬁrms may consider the reputation
of their Hong Kong counterparts because they share the same international brand name,
which in turn changes the incentives of domestic Big 4 member ﬁrms and results in lower
levels of accruals.
Using a sample of cross-listed ﬁrms during the period 1998-2008, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size
and leverage are the two main determinants of whether CL ﬁrms hire Big 4 ﬁrms to con-
duct their domestic audits. Moreover, we ﬁnd that auditor choice affects the pattern of
accruals in CL ﬁrms. CL ﬁrms with domestic Big 4 auditors have lower unsigned total
accruals and unsigned abnormal working capital accruals, relative to CL ﬁrms audited
by non-Big 4 auditors. This ﬁnding is robust to controlling for a number of variables,
including ﬁrm size, leverage, performance, etc. In addition, to mitigate the self-selection
problem in auditor choice, we compare the accruals patterns for Big 4 CL clients and
non-Big 4 CL clients using a matched sample based on the propensity of CL ﬁrms to choose
Big 4 auditors, and our conclusions are unchanged. Furthermore, by investigating the com-
ponents of accruals, we ﬁnd that the difference between the accruals of Big 4 and non-Big
4 clients can be attributed mainly to differences in the impairment of assets.
One alternative explanation for the above results is the joint (two) Big 4 pair, per se,
which may supply higher audit quality than other auditor pairs. Francis et al. (2009) use
France as their research setting, where two (joint) auditors are required by law, and ﬁnd
that ﬁrms that use two Big 4 auditors have smaller income-increasing abnormal accruals
compared with other ﬁrms. To rule out this explanation, we examine the association be-
tween auditor choice and accruals using another sample consisting of listed ﬁrms that is-
sue both A-shares to domestic investors and B-shares to overseas investors (referred to as
AB ﬁrms). Before 2007, AB ﬁrms were also required to report their accounting data using
Chinese GAAP and IFRS and hire domestic and overseas auditors to audit their ﬁnancial
statements. However, AB ﬁrms are now subject to regulation by the CSRC and their ﬁnan-
cial reporting environment is similar to that of other A-share ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that AB ﬁrms
with Big 4 auditors have higher unsigned total accruals and similar levels of abnormal
working capital accruals than AB ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors. Therefore, two (joint)
Big 4 audits does not necessarily enhance audit quality in China.
Our study extends the cross-listing literature by exploring the mechanism by which
cross-listing has the potential to improve accounting quality. The paper also contributes
to the quality-differential audit literature by providing evidence for how the auditing envi-
ronment and reputation shape the behavior of Big 4 accounting ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide some institu-
tional background on the audit markets in mainland China and Hong Kong and develop
our hypotheses. Section 3 details our auditor choice and accruals measures and provides
the main empirical results. Section 4 presents additional tests and Section 5 summarizes
and concludes the study.
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The Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited (A-share code 600600) ﬁrst issued H-shares
(H-share code 00168) in 1993. By the end of 2008, a further 57 domestic ﬁrms had issued
A-shares and H-shares. According to the HKEx listing rules, all listed ﬁrms’ accountancy
reports must be prepared by certiﬁed public accountants who are qualiﬁed under the
Professional Accountants Ordinance, and such accounting ﬁrms must normally have an
international name and reputation and be a member of a recognized body of accountants.2
Therefore, a domestic ﬁrm cross-listing on HKEx must hire a qualiﬁed Hong Kong auditor to
audit its ﬁnancial statements based on IFRS. Meanwhile, according to CSRC regulations,
A-shares ﬁrms must prepare their ﬁnancial statements based on Chinese GAAP and they
must be audited by a designated domestic auditor. Thus, a CL ﬁrm is mandated to provide
two ﬁnancial statements (dual-reporting), audited by a domestic auditor and a Hong Kong
auditor, respectively. In addition, CL ﬁrms must reconcile items for bottom-line net income
and shareholders’ equity at a fairly summary level.
Hong Kong has consistently been viewed as one of the best ﬁnancial markets in terms of
investor protection. International Big 4 auditors have dominated the audit market in Hong
Kong.3 Studies indicate that reputation is important for audit service pricing in Hong Kong.
For example, DeFond et al. (2000a) examine the audit fees of Big 6 and non-Big 6 accounting
ﬁrms using a sample of 348 publicly listed Hong Kong companies and ﬁnd evidence of Big 6
premiums for both general brand name and for industry specialization. Firth and Lau (2004)
analyze the 1997 merger between Kwan Wong Tan and Fong (KWTF) and Deloitte Touche
and Tohmatsu (DTT) to become DTT, and the 1998 merger between Coopers and Lybrand
(CL) and Price Waterhouse (PW) to form PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). Their evidence indi-
cates that there are both across-ﬁrm and within-ﬁrm pre- and post-merger fee differences
between Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors in Hong Kong. In addition, some cross-country studies
on accounting quality suggest that listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong have more conservative re-
ported earnings and less earnings management than those in other emerging markets
(e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006).
Relative to Hong Kong, China’s emerging market is relatively immature and its weak
investor protection has been criticized for extensive government intervention and signif-
icant expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders and corporate man-
agers (Jian and Wong, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010), which weaken the demand for high-quality
accounting data and audit services. Research on accounting and auditing in China conﬁrms
this is the case. For example, DeFond et al. (2000b) ﬁnd a decline in audit market share
among large auditors following the release of new auditing standards in 1995. Chan
et al. (2006) provide evidence that local auditors, who have greater economic dependence
on local clients and are subject to more political inﬂuence from local governments, are in-
clined to report favorably on local government-owned companies to mitigate probable
economic losses. Wang et al. (2008) document that Chinese state-owned enterprises are
more likely to hire small auditors from the same region (low-quality auditors). They sug-
gest that this pattern of auditor choice is likely to be explained by SOEs’ lack of demand for
high-quality audit services. Both the existing literature and anecdotal evidence imply that2 See ‘‘Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (Chapter 4).’’
3 DeFond et al. (2000a) reported that the Big 6 ﬁrms had approximately 80% market share as measured by the number of listed
clientele.
B. Wang, Q. Xin / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 233–251 237reputation considerations are less likely to drive the behavior of auditors in China’s audit
market.
To date, numerous studies have examined the quality differentials between Big 4 audi-
tors and non-Big 4 auditors. The evidence supports the notion that Big 4 accounting ﬁrms
supply higher-quality audits (see the review by Francis (2004)). However, some studies
also indicate that differences in the proxies for audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big
4 audit ﬁrms could be a reﬂection of their respective clients’ characteristics (e.g., Lawrence
et al., 2011), especially in non-US audit markets. Using a cross-country sample from 1994
to 2004, Francis and Wang (2008) ﬁnd no difference in the earnings quality of Big 4 and
non-Big 4 clients when investor protection is very weak. This suggests that in the absence
of investor protection, Big 4 auditors simply do not have incentives to enforce high-quality
earnings and risk dismissal by their clients. By investigating several audit proxies (e.g.,
propensity to issue modiﬁed audit opinions, discretionary accruals), Liu and Zhou
(2007) ﬁnd that audit quality differentials between Big 4 ﬁrms and non-Big 4 ﬁrms do
not exist in China’s A-share market. However, studies also provide evidence that Big 4
ﬁrms play a stronger governance role in emerging markets and charge higher audit fees
(e.g., Fan and Wong, 2005; Choi and Wong, 2007; Choi et al., 2008). The mixed and incon-
clusive results on the quality differential between Big 4 ﬁrms and non-Big 4 ﬁrms in
emerging markets motivate the present study.
If a CL ﬁrm’s domestic and overseas auditors are member ﬁrms of the same international
Big 4 accounting ﬁrm, then investors should expect the two auditors to have similar pro-
fessional judgment for the transactions and events of the same ﬁrm. Given that overseas
(Hong Kong) Big 4 auditors provide high-quality audits in the Hong Kong market, and
due to the deterrent effect of sharing the same international brand name, the domestic
Big 4 auditor is unlikely to allow managers to opportunistically report its domestic
earnings because it needs to take the reputation of its Hong Kong counterpart into account.
In contrast, if the Hong Kong auditor does not supply high-quality audits, and/or the
domestic auditor does not have the same brand name as the overseas auditor, then the
deterrent effect is weak and domestic auditors would not necessarily supply higher quality
audits for CL ﬁrms. In our sample, if a CL ﬁrm’s domestic auditor is a Big 4 ﬁrm, then the
ﬁrms’ overseas auditor is generally the same brand name Big 4 ﬁrm. Conversely, if the
domestic auditor is a non-Big 4 ﬁrm, then the ﬁrms’ overseas auditor generally does not
share the same brand name. Therefore, we conjecture that domestic Big 4 auditors should
be more effective at containing CL ﬁrms’ aggressive or opportunistic reporting of domestic
earnings than non-Big 4 domestic auditors.3. The association between auditor choice and accruals
3.1. Data
We ﬁrst obtain a list of A-share companies whose shares were cross-listed on HKEx (H-
shares) at the end of 2008 from the CSMAR database. We then identify the listing date on
the Chinese stock market (the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change) and HKEx to determine the ﬁrst cross-listing calendar-year for each CL ﬁrm. We
discard ﬁrms in the ﬁnance industry because the characteristics of accruals for this indus-
try differ from other industries. We thereby obtain 324 cross-listed ﬁrm-year observations
for the period 1998–2008. Our sample period starts from 1998 because that is when
Table 1
Frequencies of cross-listed ﬁrms from 1998 to 2008.
Observations Frequency
Panel A: Auditor type analysis
Total 324 100.00
Domestic auditors
– Big 4 229 70.67
– Non-Big 4 95 29.33
Overseas auditors
– Big 4 290 89.51
– Non-Big 4 34 10.49
Domestic and overseas auditors are the same 237 73.14
– The same Big 4 225 69.44
– The same Non-Big 4 12 3.70
Year Big 4 audits Non-Big 4 audits Total
Observations Frequency Observations Frequency Observations Frequency
Panel B: Year analysis
1998 12 3.70 6 1.85 18 5.55
1999 14 4.32 5 1.54 19 5.86
2000 13 4.01 6 1.85 19 5.86
2001 17 5.24 7 2.16 24 7.40
2002 19 5.86 8 2.46 27 8.33
2003 20 6.17 9 2.78 29 8.95
2004 22 6.79 9 2.78 31 9.57
2005 22 6.79 8 2.47 30 9.26
2006 26 8.02 9 2.78 35 10.80
2007 32 9.87 13 4.01 45 13.89
2008 32 9.87 15 4.62 47 14.51
Total 229 70.67 95 29.33 324 100.00
Panel C: Industry analysis
Mining 29 8.95 1 0.30 30 9.26
Manufacturing 127 39.20 61 18.82 188 58.02
Utilities 16 4.93 0 0.00 16 4.94
Construction 4 1.23 0 0.00 4 1.23
Transportation 35 10.80 21 6.48 56 17.28
IT 4 1.23 12 3.70 16 4.94
Real estate 3 0.93 0 0.00 3 0.93
Social Services 11 3.40 0 0.00 11 3.39
Total 229 70.67 95 29.33 324 100.00
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
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are pivotal for calculating accruals and each component of accruals.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of our sample by auditor type, and by year and industry
for Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients. As presented in panel A of Table 1, of the 324 cross-
listed observations, 229 (70.67%) and 290 (89.51%) sample ﬁrms hire Big 4 auditors for
domestic ﬁnancial statements and overseas ﬁnancial statements, respectively. Note that
225 cross-listed ﬁrms hire the same Big 4 ﬁrm for both domestic and overseas audits,
whereas only 12 non-Big 4 audited cross-listed ﬁrms hire the same ﬁrm. Although the
observations are spread among the industries, approximately 85% are in the manufactur-
ing, transportation and mining industries.44 Our results do not change substantially if we use the ﬁrm sample for these three industries alone.
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domestic Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors and results of difference tests between the
groups. To mitigate the effects of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the
ﬁrst and 99th percentiles. CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors are, on average, larger than CL ﬁrms
with non-Big 4 auditors in terms of total assets and sales. The differences in mean (med-
ian) total assets and sales are RMB 44.88 billion (11.30 billion) and RMB 44.76 billion (7.72
billion), respectively, and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The leverage for Big 4
audited CL ﬁrms is also signiﬁcantly higher at the 1% level than that of non-Big 4 audited
ﬁrms. In terms of accounting performance, CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors have better ROA
and are less likely to make a loss than CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors. In addition, the
median market-to-book ratio (MTB) for Big 4 clients is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of
non-Big 4 clients. In contrast, CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors have greater median sales
growth. Therefore, it is unclear whether Big 4 audited ﬁrms have higher growth prospects
given that both MTB and sales growth could be used as measures of growth opportunities.
In general, the above evidence suggests that CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors are better qualityTable 2
Descriptive statistics of ﬁrm characteristics for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 samples.
Variables Big 4 audits (N = 229)
mean (median)
Non-Big 4 audits (N = 95)
mean (median)
p-Value for tests of
differences (two-tailed)
Total Assets 56.88 12.001 <0.01
(RMB billion) (14.691) (3.391) <0.01
Sales 53.550 8.791 <0.01
(RMB billion) (9.790) (2.076) <0.01
Size 23.390 22.31 <0.01
23.410 21.94 <0.01
Leverage 0.467 0.547 <0.01
0.449 0.509 <0.01
OCF 0.089 0.073 0.10
0.089 0.063 0.01
ROA 0.040 0.024 0.09
0.041 0.026 0.03
Loss 0.153 0.326 <0.01
0.000 0.000 –
MTB 3.187 3.660 0.19
2.371 2.843 0.04
Sales growth 0.233 0.176 0.24
0.184 0.132 0.02
State ownership 0.539 0.469 <0.01
0.571 0.482 <0.01
Foreign ownership 0.053 0.047 0.63
0.002 0.002 0.65
Protect dummy 0.689 0.274 <0.01
1.000 0.000 –
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end
of year. OCF is current operating cash ﬂow divided by average total assets. ROA is return on assets, measured as net income
divided by average total assets. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has an operating loss in the
current year. MTB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of year. Sales growth is the percentage change in sales over the
previous year. State ownership is the percentage of shares owned by state shareholders. Foreign ownership is the percentage
of foreign ownership among the 10 largest shareholders at the end of the reporting period. Protect dummy is an indicator of
whether ﬁrms are from protected industries. Petrochemical, energy, raw materials and transportation are viewed as pro-
tected industries. T-tests and rank-sum tests are employed to test the differences in the means and medians of variables,
respectively.
Table 3
Firm characteristics and auditor choice.
Variables Predicted sign
Size + 1.021(3.88)***
Leverage  3.988(2.17)**
ROA + 10.468(2.17)**
Loss  1.209(2.26)**
MTB + 0.035(0.47)
Sales growth + 0.276(0.67)
State ownership + 0.325(0.14)
Foreign ownership + 0.791(0.33)
Protect dummy + 0.597(0.78)
Year ﬁxed effect Yes
N 324
Pseudo-R2 0.248
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998
to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry). The results are based on the probit model. The
dependent variable is the auditor choice dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
clients hire a Big 4 auditor for domestic audits in that year and 0 otherwise. The Z-
statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. Other
variables are deﬁned in Table 2. The sample is winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of
ﬁrm-year observations.
** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels, respectively.
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addition, CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors have higher mean and median state ownership than
CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors, and the differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. How-
ever, the two groups have similar foreign ownership. Finally, we also check whether Big 4
clients are more likely to be from protected industries than non-Big 4 clients. Following
Aharony et al. (2000), we view petrochemical, energy and raw materials as protected
industries. We also view ﬁrms in the transportation industry as protected ﬁrms in terms
of monopoly practices in China.5 In Table 2, 68.9% of the CL ﬁrm-years with Big 4 auditors
are from protected industries, compared with 27.4% of the CL ﬁrm-years with non-Big 4 au-
dited auditors, and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
3.2. Firm characteristics and auditor choice
In addition to the descriptive evidence presented in Table 2, we also run a probit regres-
sion for the pooled sample of 324 ﬁrm-year observations to investigate how ﬁrm charac-
teristics affect auditor choice for CL ﬁrms. The dependent variable is a dichotomous
indicator for Big 4 versus non-Big 4 domestic auditors. The independent variables include
ﬁrm size (natural log of total assets), leverage, ROA,6 loss, market-to-book (MTB), sales
growth, state ownership, foreign ownership and a protected industry dummy. We also con-
trol for calendar-year ﬁxed effects. The coefﬁcients and the corresponding z-values based on
robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are presented in Table 3. We ﬁnd that
only size, leverage, ROA and loss have statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Consistent with5 The results presented in the following tables do not change if we view transportation as an unprotected industry.
6 If we use OCF to replace ROA as a measure of accounting performance in Table 3, then the coefﬁcient for OCF is -4.504 and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, similar to ROA.
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auditors are more likely to be used by large and lower-leverage ﬁrms. In addition, loss ﬁrms
are less likely to have Big 4 auditors. However, inconsistent with prior research and the
descriptive evidence in Table 2, the coefﬁcient of ROA is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. This suggests that the ROA effect may be conditional on other explanatory
variables.7 In conclusion, the main drivers for ﬁrms using Big 4 auditors are ﬁrm size and
leverage.3.3. Auditor choice and accruals
In an attempt to capture the effects of auditor choice on accruals patterns, we use two
measures of accruals according to the previous literature. First, we examine the associa-
tion between auditor choice and total accruals because the literature suggests that accru-
als models have limited predictive accuracy and power to detect earnings management
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995), and this problem may be
more serious in emerging markets such as China. Total accruals (TAC) is measured as
the difference between net income (NI) and cash ﬂows from operating activities (CFO) di-
vided by average total assets.8 Second, in line with prior literature (e.g., DeFond and Park,
2001; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Francis et al., 2009), we use abnormal working capital accru-
als (AWCA) as a second accruals measure. DeFond and Park (2001) ﬁnd AWCA to be a more
powerful test in comparison to using total accruals. In addition, prior research also suggests
that management has the greatest discretion over working capital accruals (Ashbaugh et al.,
2003; Becker et al., 1998). Speciﬁcally, the measure is:7 We
explan
the co
8 As
contro
qualitAWCAt ¼ WCt  ½ðWCt1=St1ÞSt; ð1Þwhere t is the year and t  1 refers to the prior year; WCt, the non-cash working capital in
the current year computed as (current assets–cash and short-term investment)–(current
liabilities–short-term debt); WCt1, the non-cash working capital in the previous year;
St, the sales in the current year; and St is the sales in the previous year.
We scale all variables by average total assets according to Carey and Simnett (2006). In
addition to investigating the absolute amount of accruals, we also distinguish between
accruals according to their sign because the literature suggests that income-increasing
accruals have different risks and implications from income-decreasing accruals (e.g.,
Kim et al., 2003).
Table 4 reports the univariate analysis for the accruals measures for Big 4 and non-Big 4
clients. We conduct parametric (t-tests) and nonparametric tests (rank-sum tests) to
examine whether the differences in accruals measures for the two groups are statistically
signiﬁcant. The results presented in panel A indicate that CL ﬁrms audited by Big 4
auditors have lower absolute total accruals than CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors. The
mean unsigned total accruals for non-Big 4 clients is 0.083, approximately 30% more thanregress auditor choice on ROA by itself and ﬁnd that the sign for ROA is positive but insigniﬁcant. We then add the other
atory variables one-by-one and ﬁnd that LOSS and SIZE cause the coefﬁcient of ROA to be signiﬁcantly negative. Indeed,
rrelation coefﬁcient is -0.66 between ROA and Loss and 0.23 between ROA and Size.
a robustness check, we also use industry-year median adjusted TAC (IATAC) as an alternative measure of accruals to
l for the common determinants of accruals among ﬁrms within the same industry and calendar effects. The results are
atively identical.
Table 4
Univariate analysis of accruals.
Accruals variables Big 4 Audits Non-Big 4 Audits p-value for tests of
differences (two-tailed)N Value N Value
Panel A: Total accruals analysis
|TAC| Mean 229 0.063 95 0.083 0.01
Median 229 0.052 95 0.063 0.12
Std. 229 0.053 95 0.080
|TAC| Mean 42 0.041 29 0.052 0.34
(TACP0) Median 42 0.023 29 0.040 0.12
Std. 42 0.049 29 0.043
|TAC| Mean 187 0.068 66 0.096 <0.01
(TA<0) Median 187 0.057 66 0.077 0.06
Std. 187 0.053 66 0.089
Panel B: Abnormal working capital current accruals analysis
|AWCA| Mean 229 0.072 95 0.123 <0.01
Median 229 0.046 95 0.062 0.09
Std. 229 0.078 95 0.223
|AWCA| Mean 120 0.076 46 0.094 0.25
(AWCAP0) Median 120 0.053 46 0.050 0.45
Std. 120 0.084 46 0.095
|AWCA| Mean 109 0.068 49 0.151 <0.01
(AWCA<0) Median 109 0.045 49 0.066 0.11
Std. 109 0.071 49 0.295
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
TAC is measured as the difference between net income and cash ﬂows from operating activities divided by average total
assets. |TAC| is the absolute value of TAC. IATAC is the industry-year median adjusted TAC. AWCA is abnormal working
capital accruals. t-Tests and rank-sum tests are employed to test the differences in the means and medians of variables,
respectively.
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cally insigniﬁcant income-increasing accruals than non-Big 4 clients. In terms of
income-decreasing accruals, non-Big 4 clients have more negative total accruals than
Big 4 clients and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are somewhat
inconsistent with the literature. For example, Francis et al. (1999) ﬁnd ﬁrms with higher
absolute total accruals more likely to hire Big 4 auditors, even though they have lower dis-
cretionary accruals relative to non-Big 4 clients. However, the univariate evidence pre-
sented by Becker et al. (1998) suggests this is not the case. In addition, Francis and
Krishnan (1999) document that income-increasing accruals are more likely to result in
conservative reporting than incoming-decreasing accruals.
In panel B of Table 4, we examine the differences in abnormal working capital accruals
between the two types of sample ﬁrms. The results based on AWCA are similar to those
based on total accruals. Big 4 clients have less absolute abnormal working capital accruals
than non-Big 4 clients. Further tests suggest the difference is only statistically signiﬁcant
for income-decreasing accruals.
The purpose of our study is to compare accruals patterns across our Big 4 and non-Big 4
samples. Although we conduct univariate tests, we also use a multivariate test to control
for the potential factors that simultaneously affect a ﬁrm’s choice of auditor and its accru-
als properties. In our multivariate analysis, the accruals measures are regressed on a dum-
my variable indicating auditor type and several control variables.
Table 5
Regression analysis of accruals.
|TAC| (1) |TAC| (TACP0) (2) |TAC| (TAC<0) (3) |AWCA| (4) |AWCA|
(AWCAP0) (5)
|AWCA|
(AWCA<0) (6)
Big 4 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.043 0.007 0.079
(0.29) (0.97) (0.89) (2.20)** (0.32) (1.87)*
Size 0.006 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.018 0.002
(1.69)* (2.92)*** (3.10)*** (1.01) (2.24)** (0.17)
Leverage 0.097 0.026 0.118 0.019 0.004 0.027
(2.81)*** (1.02) (4.77)*** (0.36) (0.08) (0.35)
OCF 0.331 0.604 0.562 0.403 0.107 0.734
(2.82)*** (5.32)*** (5.87)*** (2.38)** (1.20) (1.99)**
Loss 0.044 0.022 0.065 0.025 0.048 0.044
(3.26)*** (1.33) (5.60)*** (1.58) (3.06)*** (0.96)
Firm/year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 324 71 253 324 166 158
R2 0.281 0.467 0.447 0.094 0.078 0.153
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
This table reports estimates from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variables are accruals
proxies. The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned in Table 2 and Table 4. t-Statistics are presented in paren-
theses below the coefﬁcients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a
two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level. The sample is winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of ﬁrm-year observations.
* Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels, respectively.
** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels, respectively.
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mance signiﬁcantly affect auditor choice. Therefore, we include size, leverage, loss and
OCF in the regressions.9 We do not include ROA, because accruals are a component of earn-
ings. We also include year dummies. Because we use unbalanced panel data, there could be
both time-series and cross-sectional interdependence in the error terms of the OLS regres-
sion. There could also be heteroskedasticity. Consequently, the OLS standard errors may
be biased and either overestimate or underestimate the true variability of the coefﬁcient
estimates (Petersen, 2009). Therefore, in calculating the standard errors we adjust for clus-
ters at both the ﬁrm and year level, as recommended by Petersen (2009).10 (http://www.kel-
logg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm). Table 5
presents the results of the multivariate regressions.
In column (1), the coefﬁcient of Big 4 is 0.002 but insigniﬁcant, which is inconsistent
with the results from the univariate tests presented in Table 4, indicating that the differ-
ence in total accruals across the two groups may be induced by other ﬁrm characteristics.
In columns (2) and (3), we examine the association between auditor choice and income-
increasing accruals and income-decreasing accruals after controlling for other factors.
Again, the coefﬁcients for Big 4 are not statistically signiﬁcant.9 We do not include sales growth, MTB, state ownership, foreign ownership or the protected industry dummy in the regression
because these variables are not correlated with the choice of auditor (see Table 3). In the matched propensity analysis, these
variables are controlled for in the sense that they are included in the auditor choice selection model. Finally, as a robustness
check, we include these variables in the regression and our conclusions remain robust after controlling for these effects.
10 Petersen (2009) documents that standard errors clustered on multiple dimensions are unbiased and produce correctly sized
conﬁdence intervals for panel data in corporate ﬁnance applications. We use the Stata command cluster2, downloaded from
Mitchell Petersen’s website: (http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm).
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working capital accruals. The coefﬁcient for Big 4 is 0.043 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(the t-statistic is 2.20) in column (4), suggesting that Big 4 clients have lower unsigned
discretionary accruals than non-Big 4 clients. In columns (5) and (6), we examine the effect
of auditor choice on income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals.
Both Big 4 coefﬁcients are negative but only statistically signiﬁcant for income-decreasing
accruals, consistent with the results from the univariate tests in Table 4. Taken together,
the evidence from the multivariate regressions suggests that CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors
have lower unsigned discretionary accruals than total accruals compared with CL ﬁrms
with non-Big 4 auditors. Meanwhile, the differences in income-decreasing discretionary
accruals across the two groups of sample ﬁrms are larger than income-increasing accruals.
The signiﬁcant difference between income-decreasing accruals and income-increasing
accruals is somewhat inconsistent with the US literature. The results could be induced
by managers’ strong incentives to ‘‘take a big bath’’ in the Chinese stock market (Li and
Li, 2005). Because earnings quality is impaired if earnings are either overstated or under-
stated, our evidence suggests that CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors are likely to have higher
earnings quality than CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors.
Nevertheless, we aim to understand why CL ﬁrms audited by non-Big 4 auditors have
more negative abnormal accruals than CL ﬁrms audited by Big 4 auditors. First, we assume
that auditors only have incentives to contain their clients’ accruals choice when their earn-
ings management exceeds a certain threshold. Further, we predict that the audit quality
differential between Big 4 and non-Big 4 should be more signiﬁcant for extremely large
abnormal accruals. To test this prediction, in Fig. 1 we plot the frequency distribution
based on deciles of signed abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) for Big 4 and
non-Big 4 clients, respectively.
In Fig. 1, for the lowest interval (Interval 1, the lowest 10%) of AWCA, the frequency is
16% for non-Big 4 clients and 8% for Big 4 clients. For the highest interval (Interval 10,
the highest 10%) of AWCA, the frequency is 14% for non-Big 4 and 8% for Big 4. That is,
30% of non-Big 4 clients have either the lowest negative AWCA or the highest positive
AWCA, whereas this amount is only 16% for Big 4 clients. This preliminary evidence sug-
gests that Big 4 auditors are more effective in deterring clients from extreme income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management than Non-Big 4 auditors.
According to our previous ﬁndings, there is an insigniﬁcant difference in income-
increasing AWCA between Big 4 and Non-Big 4 clients. One reason for this ﬁnding may
be the small sample size, which reduces the power of the tests. After all, according toFig. 1. CL Clients’ frequency distribution based on deciles of abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA).
Table 6
Analysis of ‘‘big bath’’ and the reversal of abnormal working capital accruals: CL clients of Big 4 versus CL
clients of non-Big 4.
The lowest 10% of AWCA in year t (Decile 1)
Big 4 mean (median) [N] Non Big 4 mean (median) [N] Difference tests (p-value, one-tailed)
DAWCAt+1 0.228 0.382 0.10
(0.220) (0.334) 0.09
[17] [12]
DAWCAt+2 0.265 0.404 0.07
(0.230) (0.343) 0.06
[14] [10]
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 with extremely negative (the
lowest 10%) AWCA. DAWCAt+1 is calculated as the difference between AWCAt+1 and AWCAt. DAWCAt+2 is calculated as the
difference between AWCAt+2 and AWCAt. t-Tests and rank-sum tests are employed to test the differences in the means and
medians of variables (one-tailed), respectively.
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and low-quality auditors is only apparent when clients have extreme opportunistic earn-
ings management.
For negative (income-decreasing) AWCA, we conjecture that clients have ‘‘big bath’’
incentives, and Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in constraining
the ‘‘big bath’’ behavior of clients. However, other factors (e.g., losses) could induce non-
Big 4 clients to have more negative abnormal accruals than Big 4 clients.
The purpose of ‘‘taking a big bath’’ is to reverse accruals in the future. Accordingly, we
predict that future reversals in abnormal accruals should be high for ‘‘big bath’’ clients. To
examine this argument, we calculate the change in AWCA from year t to year t + 1 (and
year t + 2) for extremely negative AWCA groups and compare the difference inDAWCA be-
tween Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. Table 6 presents the results.
Clients with large negative abnormal working capital accruals in year t have larger
reversals in year t + 1 and year t + 2. Table 6 shows that the mean (median) change in
AWCA in year t + 1 (DAWCAt+1) is 0.228 (0.220) and 0.382 (0.334) for Big 4 and non-Big
4 clients, respectively. A one-tailed t-test (rank sum test) shows the difference is signiﬁ-
cant at the 10% level. The analysis of DAWCAt+2 shows similar results. The evidence pre-
sented in Fig. 1 and Table 6 suggests that non-Big 4 clients are more likely to ‘‘take a
big bath’’ than Big 4 clients. Although we cannot completely rule out alternative explana-
tions, our evidence implies that Big 4 auditors provide higher-quality audits for CL ﬁrms
than non-Big 4 auditors.4. Additional tests
4.1. Auditor choice and accruals patterns for AB ﬁrms
So far, we ﬁnd that CL ﬁrms that appoint Big 4 ﬁrms for domestic audits have lower
absolute abnormal working capital accruals than other CL ﬁrms. Our explanation is that
domestic member ﬁrms of the international Big 4 need to take the reputation of their Hong
Kong counterparts into account because they share the same international brand name
and therefore have an incentive to constrain their clients’ aggressive reporting behavior.
One might conjecture that the differences in the two groups’ accruals patterns could be
Table 7
Regression analysis of accruals using the ‘‘A+B share’’ sample.
Dependent
variables
|TAC| (1) |TAC|(TACP0) (2) |TAC| (TAC<0) (3) |AWCA| (4) |AWCA|
(AWCAP0) (5)
|AWCA|
(AWCA<0) (6)
Big 4 0.021 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.021
(2.94)*** (2.45)** (1.55) (0.64) (0.70) (0.70)
Size 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.016 0.005 0.017
(1.49) (0.31) (3.69)*** (2.02)** (0.74) (1.17)
Leverage 0.091 0.014 0.113 0.160 0.066 0.180
(3.74)*** (0.78) (4.40)*** (2.95)*** (2.80)*** (2.70)***
OCF 0.218 0.619 0.599 0.243 0.286 0.254
(3.19)*** (9.22)*** (12.39)*** (1.81)* (2.69)*** (1.15)
Loss 0.053 0.041 0.085 0.039 0.021 0.038
(9.13)*** (5.02)*** (11.60)*** (1.29) (2.23)** (0.67)
Firm/Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 755 229 526 755 387 368
R2 0.316 0.543 0.523 0.138 0.095 0.139
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with B-shares from 1998 to 2006 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
This table reports estimates from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variables are accruals
proxies. The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned in Table 2 and Table 4. t-statistics are presented in paren-
theses below the coefﬁcients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a
two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level. The sample is winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of ﬁrm-year observations.
* Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels, respectively.
** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels, respectively.
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than other auditor pairs (Francis et al., 2009). Fortunately, the Chinese setting allows us
to rule out this alternative explanation, because Chinese-listed companies with B-shares
were also required to conduct a dual-audit before 2007.11 Unlike the Hong Kong audit mar-
ket, the B-share audit market is greatly affected by Chinese institutional forces. For example,
it has the same monitors (the two stock exchanges and the CSRC) and similar investors to the
A-share audit market.12 Therefore, if auditors have a similar incentive to conduct audits in
both the B-share and the A-share markets, and if Big 4 ﬁrms do not supply higher audit qual-
ity in the A-share market, as documented in the literature (Liu and Zhou, 2007), then we
would not expect accruals patterns to be strongly associated with auditor choice for B-share
ﬁrms. In examining the propensity to issue modiﬁed audit opinions, Li andWu (2003) ﬁnd no
evidence that supplementary auditing in the B-share market improves audit quality.
To analyze this issue, we examine the association between auditor choice and accruals
patterns using a sample of B-share listed ﬁrms for the period 1998–2006. We identify 89
AB ﬁrms with 755 ﬁrm-year observations. Twenty-four and a half percent (185 of 755) of
the AB ﬁrm-years hired Big 4 auditors for domestic audits. The estimated results are pre-
sented in Table 7. The models, variable deﬁnitions and estimation methods in Table 7 are
consistent with those in Table 5. The results in column (1) show that the coefﬁcient for Big
4 is positive and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating that the B-share clients of Big
4 auditors have higher accruals than the B-share clients of non-Big 4 auditors. Further tests11 On September 12, 2007, the CSRC released a notice that cancelled the requirement for dual audits in the B-share market.
12 Before 2001, Chinese listed companies issued B-shares (denominated in foreign currencies) to foreign investors. Since
February 19, 2001, domestic investors have been allowed to use their legitimate holdings of foreign currency to trade B-shares
according to the announcement issued by the CSRC.
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icantly higher income-increasing total accruals than AB ﬁrms audited by non-Big 4 ﬁrms.
Considering the results using abnormal working capital accruals in columns (4)–(6), three
of the coefﬁcients for Big 4 are negative but insigniﬁcant, suggesting that there is no sys-
tematic association between auditor choice and discretionary accruals. Overall, the evi-
dence reported in Table 7 suggests that Big 4 auditors are not more effective at
constraining clients’ aggressive earnings reporting than non-Big 4 auditors in the B-share
market, consistent with our prediction and with prior studies in China. The evidence also
indicates that dual-audits per se do not improve clients’ quality of earnings, contrary to the
ﬁndings reported by Francis et al. (2009).4.2. Analysis of industry-adjusted accruals components
In Tables 4 and 5, we ﬁnd some evidence that CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors are more
likely to understate their earnings than CL ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors. A natural question is
how CL ﬁrms manage their earnings. We aim to answer this by examining the differences
in the accruals components between clients of Big 4 auditors and clients of non-Big 4 audi-
tors. Speciﬁcally, we compute four accruals components: depreciation and amortization
(DEPAMO), provision for asset impairment (PAIM), annual change in inventory (DINV)
and annual change in accounts receivable (DAR). To remove size and industry effects,
the four accruals components are scaled by average total assets and adjusted by indus-
try-year median values. In Table 8, we present the four accruals components separately
for Big 4 and non-Big 4 subsamples and conduct difference tests. The results show that
the mean and median DEPAMO and DAR are similar for the two groups. However, the
mean (median) PAIM is 0.005 (0.000) for Big 4 clients, which is lower than for non-Big
4 clients. The differences are statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that clients of non-Big 4
auditors write down more asset impairment losses. The ﬁnding that Big 4 audit clients
have a lower provision for impairment losses may explain why CL ﬁrms with Big 4 audi-
tors have lower income-decreasing accruals than CL ﬁrms with non-Big 4 auditors. In
terms of the change in inventory, although the t-test suggests that Big 4 audit clients have
a greater positive increase in inventory than non-Big 4 clients (the p-value is 0.04), the
rank-sum test indicates that the difference in DINV is insigniﬁcant (the p-value is only
0.36). In summary, the evidence presented in Table 8 shows that asset impairment is anTable 8
Analysis of industry-adjusted accruals components.
Accruals components Big 4 Audits (N=229) Non-Big 4 Audits (N=95) p-Value for tests of differences (two-tailed)
Mean Median Mean Median t-test Rank-sum test
DEPAMO 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.37 0.28
PAIM 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.07 0.04
DINV 0.010 0.000 .001 0.001 0.04 0.36
DAR 0.016 0.008 0.019 0.015 0.57 0.63
Notes: The sample is comprised of A-share listed companies with H-shares from 1998 to 2008 (excluding ﬁnance industry).
DEPAMO is the industry-year adjusted depreciation and amortization scaled by average total assets in the year. PAIM is the
industry-year adjusted provision for asset impairment scaled by average total assets in the year.PINV is the industry-year
adjusted annual change in inventory scaled by average total assets. PAR is the industry-year adjusted annual change in
accounts receivable scaled by average total assets in the year. T-tests and rank-sum tests are employed to test the differences
in the means and medians of variables, respectively.
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and non-Big 4 auditing ﬁrms.4.3. Using a matched sample
There is an endogeneity concern for the above ﬁndings because auditor choice is not
random. Big 4 ﬁrms are more likely to choose clients with high earnings quality to mitigate
reputation and/or litigation losses. Clients with lower earnings quality may also prefer to
select non-Big 4 auditors to reduce costs (Johnson and Lys, 1990). To an extent, this self-
selection bias could be an alternative explanation for the difference in the accruals pat-
terns of Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. Many previous studies apply the Heckman two-stage
model to correct for this selectivity problem. However, Francis and Lennox (2008) point
out that many accounting researchers have been misusing the Heckman model. As an
alternative and preferable technique, Francis and Lennox (2008) suggest using ‘‘matched
propensity scores,’’ thus avoiding the need to impose any exclusion restrictions as in the
Heckman model. Several recent auditing studies have applied the matched propensity ap-
proach (e.g., Chan and Wu, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2011).
Following Francis and Lennox (2008), we implement the matching technique by ﬁrst
estimating a probit model to predict the propensity for CL ﬁrms to choose Big 4 auditors,
using the pooled 324 CL ﬁrm-year observations. The explanatory variables are the same as
those in Table 3. We then sort the sample by the predicted probabilities. For each Big 4 cli-
ent-year observation, we identify the two observations that have the closest predicted
probabilities and adopt the following matching rule: (a) if only one of the two potential
matches is a non-Big 4 client, then we choose that one as the match; (b) if both potentialTable 9
Univariate analysis of accruals using a propensity-score matched sample.
Accruals variables Big 4 Audits Non-Big 4 Audits p-value for tests of differences (two-tailed)
Panel A: Total accruals analysis
|TAC| Mean 0.063 0.083 0.12
Median 0.049 0.057 0.26
N. 73 73
|TAC| Mean 0.047 0.040 0.63
(TACP0) Median 0.032 0.033 0.81
N 20 20
|TAC| Mean 0.069 0.097 0.06
(TA<0) Median 0.061 0.077 0.13
N 53 53
Panel B: Abnormal working capital current accruals analysis
|AWCA| Mean 0.082 0.137 0.07
Median 0.059 0.092 0.08
N 73 73
|AWCA| Mean 0.097 0.098 0.98
(AWCAP0) Median 0.068 0.078 0.35
N 36 34
|AWCA| Mean 0.067 0.171 0.06
(AWCA<0) Median 0.042 0.111 0.07
N 37 39
Notes: The sample includes 73 Big 4 client-year observations and 73 matched observations of non-Big 4 client-years using
the propensity score matching approach. T-tests and rank-sum tests are employed to test the differences in the means and
medians of variables (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 10
Regression analysis of accruals using a propensity-score matched sample.
|TAC| (1) |TAC| (TACP0) (2) |TAC| (TAC<0) (3) |AWCA| (4) |AWCA|
(AWCAP0) (5)
|AWCA|
(AWCA<0) (6)
Big 4 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.068 0.002 0.114
(1.87)* (0.23) (1.44) (2.91)*** (0.05) (1.94)*
Size 0.012 0.021 0.199 0.001 0.011 0.005
(1.48) (2.32)** (1.71)* (0.04) (0.85) (0.34)
Leverage 0.137 0.097 0.169 0.014 0.044 0.053
(2.56)** (1.58) (2.87)*** (0.17) (0.38) (0.51)
OCF 0.372 0.678 0.627 0.658 0.033 1.204
(2.43)** (4.15)*** (2.81)*** (2.45)** (0.14) (2.32)**
Loss 0.053 0.032 0.077 0.019 0.022 0.051
(2.78)*** (2.96)*** (4.54)*** (0.81) (0.76) (0.87)
Firm/Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 146 40 106 146 70 76
R2 0.338 0.552 0.469 0.110 0.024 0.209
Notes: The sample includes 73 Big 4 client-year observations and 73 matched non-Big 4 client-year observations using the
propensity score matching approach. This table reports estimates from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions.
The dependent variables are accruals proxies. The dependent and independent variables are deﬁned in Table 2 and Table 4. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefﬁcients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
and time-series correlations, using a two-way cluster at the ﬁrm and year level. The sample is winsorized at the top and
bottom 1% of ﬁrm-year observations.
* Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% levels, respectively.
** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% levels, respectively.
*** Represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% levels, respectively.
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bility; and (c) if both potential matches are Big 4 clients, then we determine that there
is no suitable match. This rule ensures that we obtain extremely close matches, implying
that the scored distributions are virtually identical for Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. We are
able to identify 73 pairs of ﬁrm-year observations. We then use these 146 observations to
compare the accruals patterns for Big 4 CL and non-Big 4 CL clients.
Tables 9 and 10 present the results for the univariate analysis and multivariate analysis,
respectively. The results in Table 9 show that Big 4 clients have a smaller absolute amount
of accruals, especially for abnormal working capital accruals. In Table 10, the coefﬁcients
for Big 4 are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in column (1) and column (4), reinforcing
the conclusion from the univariate analysis. From the signed accruals tests, we also ﬁnd
that non-Big 4 clients have more negative abnormal working capital accruals than Big 4
clients, similar to the ﬁndings in Table 5. Therefore, the evidence from the matched-pairs
technique supports our conclusion that Big 4 audits are associated with ﬁrms’ accruals
patterns.5. Conclusion
This study examines the association between auditor choice and accruals properties
using a sample of Chinese ﬁrms that cross-list their shares on HKEx over the period
1998–2008. We ﬁnd that the clients of Big 4 auditors have lower unsigned accruals, espe-
cially discretionary accruals, relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors. In addition, we
ﬁnd that non-Big 4 clients are more likely to understate their earnings than Big 4 clients.
The results are robust to controlling for ﬁrm characteristics and using a matched sample.
Moreover, using a sample of listed ﬁrms with B-shares, we ﬁnd that the results cannot be
250 B. Wang, Q. Xin / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 233–251explained by dual-audits per se. Taken together, our evidence suggests that Big 4 ﬁrms
play a meaningful role in enhancing the earnings quality of cross-listed ﬁrms, which helps
to explain why cross-listed ﬁrms have higher earnings quality than their domestic coun-
terparts, as documented in the extant literature. The ﬁndings also suggest that reputation
shaped by the institutional environment can change Big 4 incentives in an emerging
market.
The study is subject to numerous caveats. The most signiﬁcant limitation is the small
sample size, and the results should therefore be interpreted with caution. In addition,
we assume that the observed difference in the accruals patterns of Big 4 audit clients
and non-Big 4 audit clients is driven by the auditing quality differential between Big 4
and non-Big 4 ﬁrms. It may be that we do not adequately control for other unobserved dif-
ferences between the two groups and that these may be driving the observed differences
in accruals patterns.Acknowledgements
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